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Constructing Teacher Knowledge:
Conflicting Views & Synthesising Possibilities
Main Description
Teacher education in England is enmeshed in a conflict between two seemingly 
opposing views of practice, the ‘standards based model’ (‘technical rationality’) 
and the reflective practitioner’ model (practical knowledge, wisdom). Yet there is 
no  clearcut  version  of  the  standards  based  model  from  which  to  extract  a 
typology, and there are many interpretations of reflection on practice. The paper 
briefly  outlines  this  context  and using  some concepts  from the  work  of  John 
Dewey  develops  a  view  of  how  teachers  learn  in  practice,  in  which  a 
reconciliation  between  the  two  opposing  theories  are  suggested.  Dewey’s 
naturalistic  epistemology  can  account  for  the  experiential  nature  of  practical 
experience and practice based learning: it provides an ‘epistemology of practice’. 
Critiques  of  Dewey’s  position  for  the  construction  of  knowledge  are 
acknowledged. 
Short Description
Dewey’s  naturalistic  epistemology  can  account  for  the  experiential  nature  of 












 Constructing Teacher Knowledge:
Conflicting Views & Synthesising Possibilities
Introduction
The status and role of knowledge is problematised in modernity by post-modern 
understandings in hermeneutics.  Out of a vast canvas I have taken a small area of 
professional practice, that of teacher training and aim to explore the nature of 
practical knowledge. The first part of the paper gives the context for the present 
discussion and the second part suggests a way of conceptualising practice that is 
helpful in both understanding its nature and in developing practitioners. Broadly 
and briefly in England at present there seem to be two opposing views of the 
knowledge  and  understanding  teachers  need  to  operate  in  conditions  of 
complexity. I consider these in turn.
Part 1 – The context of opposing views
The development  of teacher training in England over the past 40 years  shares 
some  characteristics  with  other  countries.  Over  the  period  there  has  been  a 
perceived attack on university teacher training based on scepticism about the role 
of theory in the training; an  emphasis on school based training (since the early 
1990s) and lastly the rise of competencies and ‘standards’ as an assessment tool. 
(Carr, 1993b; Pring  1996; McNamara 1996).  All these factors entail a postivist  
epistemology.  
The  context  in  which  teachers  work  in  the  classroom  is  also  widely 
acknowledged to be a complex one. (Sankey 1993), taking complexity as ‘a broad 
term  for  describing  and  understanding  a  wide  range  of  chaotic,  dissipative, 
adaptive,  non-linear  and  complex  systems  and  phenomena’.  (University  of 
Liverpool’s  Centre  for  Complexity  Research 
http://www.liv.ac.uk/ccr/what_is_complexity.htm)
Standard-practice:
In England teachers at all stages of their careers are assessed on ‘standards’ (DfES 
2002b). The view of knowledge implied in the standards is not explicitly stated 
but can be induced by looking in detail at some of the assessment instruments, 
such as the 84 standards for the award of qualified teacher status (QTS). (DfES 
2002a).  Standards  based  assessment  grew  out  of  the  competency  movement, 
conceptualised on the vocational model. Assessment of vocational skills involved 
analysis  of  discrete,  observable,  measurable,  verifiable  ‘pieces’  of  behaviour, 
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functioning  in  specified  ways  as  performance  indicators  -  evidence  that  a 
particular skill had been ‘performed’ and verified. 
There are several difficulties with competence based assessment in teaching, 
even  if  we  grant  the  possibility  of  formulating  competency  criteria  for  many 
aspects  of  a  teacher’s  job.  First,  in  order  to  be  capable  of  verification  a 
competency  statement  needs  to  cover  one  discrete,  observable  aspect  of 
competence. A teacher’s job however is extensive and complex: the number of 
competence statements is likely to be large and therefore compound competency 
statements are required. Secondly, each statement needs verification criteria, and 
these  will  necessarily  be  normative,  based  on  prior  understanding  of  what 
constitutes  good,  or  effective  performance  of  the  skill.  To  reach  the  prior 
interpretations  of  good and effective  ‘performance’  some kind of  professional 
judgement and not competency criteria had to be used.  Thirdly,  if we were to 
concede  that  competency  criteria  might  secure  judgements  on  demonstrated 
technical skills, multiple and compound statements would be needed for complex 
professional practices. So any system likely to be subtle enough to capture the 
complexity  of  the  teacher’s  technical  skills,  would  in  all  probability  be  too 
unwieldy to be very useful. There is considerable literature on the limitations of 
competencies in relation to teacher assessment. (Whitty 1991, Thompson 1992, 
Carr 1993a, Carr 1993b, Hyland 1993, Lum 1999).
Further, in normal use the term ‘competent teacher’ means more than mere 
skills competence. For example,  when a teacher stops a class because she has 
overheard  a  racist  remark,  which  she  tackles  sensitively,  knowledgeably, 
effectively,  while  upholding  the  value  of  tolerance,  we  would  say  she  dealt 
competently with the situation, drawing on her own values and her experience. 
This  might  be  called the capacity  sense  of  competence.  ‘Capacities  entail  the 
voluntary and deliberate exercise of principled judgement in the light of rational 
knowledge and understanding…Capacities  are  knowledge-driven’  (Carr  1993a. 
Pg. 253). 
Is it possible to formulate competency criteria in the capacity sense, such as 
when judging the teacher’s competent professional responsibility to ‘children and 
to society and to the profession's purposes and characteristics’? (Thompson l997, 
Pg.1). Some such statements relating to observable professional expectations are 
certainly possible,  such as  ‘the teacher  generally  arrives on time to all  school 
commitments’ or even ‘The teacher always upholds the Code of Conduct of the 
General Professional Council’,  but in a wider sense any competence statement 
falls at the hurdle of subtle values, such as integrity, or generosity of spirit, which 
might arguably be necessary teacher capacities.
In England, in response to such criticism, standards have replaced competencies 
and  it  might  be  argued  that  these  answer  the  critique  levelled  against 
competencies. The QTS standards have been designed to be used ‘holistically’ 
(DfES 2002a, p. 1.) However, problems still remain when we examine them in 
detail. One difficulty is the wide variety of different kind of elements covered by 
and  expressed  in  these  standards.  Some  are  merely  procedural  requiring 
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knowledge  of  particular  legislation  for  example,  some  are  technical,  whereas 
some are wide ranging and impossible to fully verify, such as those relating to 
values.   Some  are  ambiguously  framed  and  some  refer  to  similar  aspects  of 
teacherly behaviour in different contexts, making them difficult to disaggregate. 
This is an advantage as it shows that the standards are too varied and interrelated 
to be used in a narrowly mechanistic way.  The standards do not yield a clear cut 
version from which to extract a  typology. We can say,  however that the very 
endeavour to produce an overall list of such standards seems to suggest a view of 
verifiable knowledge that has a positivist feel to it.  Its underlying belief appears 
to  be  that  there  can  be  instances  of  teacher  behaviour  which  represent  what 
teachers  ought  to  do  and  that  teacher  performance  can  be  measured  against 
standard specifications of good teacher behaviour.  In other words it seems to be 
claimed  that  measurable  outcomes  of  good  teacher  practice  are  possible. 
Proponents of standards based training believe that there can be agreement about 
what teaching behaviour works to promote learning and that this can be described 
and encapsulated in abstract descriptions.  
Reflective practice
The  second  view  of  knowledge  implied  in  current  thinking  about  teacher 
behaviour is encapsulated in the term ‘reflective practice’. Reflective practice is 
sometimes  invoked  to  counter  inadequacies  in  the  kind  of  reductionist  view 
represented  by  the  rise  of  competencies.  (Schön 1983 and 1987;  Rose,  1992; 
Whitty  1992).  I  use the term broadly to  cover all  those beliefs about  practice 
based knowledge which claim that it is substantially different from knowledge 
about facts, and that to become a good practitioner one has to engage in some 
kind  of  ‘reflection’  on,  and  in  practice.   Generally  speaking  the  reflective 
practitioner view rejects the standards based training view as falsifying the nature 
of practice and practice-based learning, knowledge and expertise.  (Hirst,  1990; 
Moore,  2004).  Broadly  the  view is  underpinned by a  notion of  teaching as  a 
‘practice’  (MacIntyre  and  Dunne  2002;  Dunne,  2003;  Noddings,  2003; 
McLaughlin, 2003), with the good teacher being able to articulate and exemplify 
the skills and values of the practice. This puts proponents into the tradition of 
writers on the close relationship between theory and practice and what constitutes 
practical  knowledge,  or  phronesis.  (Aristotle  1996;  Dewey 1929,  1958,  1960, 
1997;  Dunne, 1993). Donald Schõn applied these notions directly to professional 
practice,  illustrating  the  model  he  developed  with  many  graphic  examples. 
Schõn’s  work  has  been  highly  influential  in  disseminating  the  idea  of  the 
reflective practitioner.  
The notion of reflection has an intuitive folk appeal but questions are raised by 
the variety of ways in which the ubiquitous term appears and the fact that it often 
seems to be used like a slogan. Accounts of what ‘reflective teaching’ is and how 
to do it are numerous and varied, and do not represent an overall model which can 
be called ‘the reflective teacher.’  This leads us to conclude that the idea has been 
inadequately defined, suffers from ‘incompleteness’ and needs to be developed 
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and situated ‘within  a richer account of the nature and requirements of teaching 
and teacher training.’ (McLaughlin, 1999. p.9).  It is not too farfetched to say that 
‘over  the  past  15  years,  reflection  has  suffered  from  a  loss  of  meaning.  In 
becoming everything to everybody, it has lost its ability to be seen.’ (Rogers 2002 
p. 842).   A further difficulty with the catch-all notion of the terms relating to 
reflection  is  that  it  can  look  as  if  it  is  not  worth  doing.  In  some courses  of 
professional  training  and  development  which  do  mention  ‘doing  reflection’ 
another issue can arise, in that lip service is paid to the notion of reflection by the 
creation  of   ‘a  “checklist”  or  “reflection  on  demand”  mentality,  reflection 
processes with no link to conceptual frameworks’.   (Boud and Walker,  1998). 
Moore and Ash (2002) term this  ‘ritualistic reflection’.  A weak conception of 
reflection will not suffice to explain its importance and its effects in the process of 
coming  to  understandings  within  practice.   These  understandings  draw  on 
experience in a complex and subtle way, which no check list can fully articulate.
The writing on reflective practice reveals a range of views on what it is and what 
its  objects  should be.  This  raises  a  number  of  issues.  First,  it  is  unclear  how 
reflection, as used in the context of a practice such as teaching, is different from 
other types of thought. Second, what is reflected upon is as important as how in 
terms of ‘knowledge creation’.  (Valli, 1993 quoted in Moore 2002).  One can 
reflect on specific, routine happenings at one level, and on general principles at 
the other and differing levels of reflection invite different forms of reflection. 
Next, the effectiveness of the reflection is difficult to assess if it is not properly 
or fully conceptualised. How will we know if the reflection is good or not, that it  
leads to valuable insights or valid conclusions, if we have an imprecise notion of 
what should be the object, content, methods and procedures relating to it? There 
can in  fact  be  ‘bad’  reflection,  by  which  I  mean ineffectual  reflection,  which 
among other things might not get at the nub of the practice under scrutiny, or 
might start from wrong assumptions, or jump to non-valid conclusions. The kind 
of ineffectual reflection in the example can actually reinforce bad practice. Moore 
and  Ash  (2002)  noted  for  example  that  some  of  their  students  ‘showed  an 
awareness in interview of the potential for reflection within any site to become 
ritualistic and meaningless - for it to become absorbed into existing structures’. 
Such reflection ‘simply reinforced current thinking and perceptions and became a 
shelter  within  which  to  hide  from  more  challenging  explanations  of 
circumstances.  Or  there  may  be  ‘”pseudo-reflection”,  involving  a  genuine 
intention to  consider  important  issues  though  not  leading  to  development  or 
change (the kind of reflection that contributes to the durability of preconceptions 
and existing perspectives through selective if not always conscious interpretation 
of events and the selection of topics, issues and events to reflect upon)’ (ibid.) 
Without  a  clear  definition  of  what  is  meant  by  reflection  it  is  difficult  to 
distinguish  when  there  has  been  ‘constructive’,  ‘productive’ or  ‘authentic’ 
reflection,  which  ‘actively  seeks  to  problematise  situations  and  to  challenge 
existing views, perspectives and beliefs, promoting or leading to development or 
change in terms of work-related understandings and/or outlooks’ (ibid.). Further, 
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without a clear and agreed definition of what reflective practice is it is difficult to 
talk about it and to share the good practice supposedly generated by, through and 
with it. ‘It is has lost its ability to be seen and therefore has begun to lose its 
value’.  (Rogers, 2002) 
It is important to articulate professional knowledge and understanding, in order to 
develop it in oneself and others.  Osterman (1990) for example views one of the 
most important aspects of the development of reflective practice to enable the 
body of professional knowledge to grow. Such sharing of good practice cannot 
occur with any degree of security, where practitioners find themselves using terms 
that  are  common  but  hold  different  meanings  or  that  are  different  but  have 
overlapping  meanings.  With  a  slippery  and  contestable  notion  of  reflective 
practice it is also difficult to research the effects of reflective teacher education 
and professional development on teachers’ practice and students’ learning. Work 
is needed on developing Schön’s insights (Schön, 1983)  into an epistemology of 
practice.
Part 11 
These two positions on standards based training and reflective practice appear to 
be in opposition but is this a false dichotomy? It seems evident that we cannot 
demonstrate  with  any  degree  of  scientific  certainty  what  constitutes  a  good 
teacher  and good teaching and that  there  cannot  be  any scientific  standard of 
complete  verifiability  and  replicability.  The  arguments  against  the 
competency/standards  model  seem  to  suggest  that  standards,  interpreted 
reductively  as  yielding  certainty  in  judgement  about  good  teaching,  cannot 
withstand arguments about the complexity and contingencies of teacher’s daily 
experience  in  the  classroom.  Yet,  when  we  look  at  the  notion  of  reflective 
practice, we see that it is not one clearly defined concept and covers a variety of 
ways of looking at practice as primarily grounded in experience. 
Experience was at the heart of John Dewey’s view of knowledge and in this 
second part of the paper I suggest briefly where we might look for a useful tool in 
bringing us closer to understanding practical knowledge. First it is useful to look 
at Dewey’s historical analysis to situate and to understand the value of his concept 
of ‘experimental empiricism’
Teacher knowledge:  a Deweyan tool
M1 and M2 are not necessarily irreconcilable. Dewey’s concept of experimental 
empiricism is useful in attempting a reconciliation because it addresses the 
experience of teachers dealing with complexity, in situations with many variables 
and attempts to elaborate and to forefront what is valuable in the scientific 
method, in terms of rigour, accountability, verifiability, replicability, whilst 
avoiding a mechanistic, technicist approach. The main point is that Dewey 
provides a defensible account of how practical knowledge develops 
experientially, which includes the teacher in the practice – the normative, 
affective and cognitive dimensions of her experiential learning, whilst retaining 
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the notion of rigour. It is useful to think of Dewey’s version a ‘scientific’ inquiry 
on the model of evolutionary biology rather than physics, in that biology focuses 
on the relationship of organism and the environment, and works with interactive 
models of complex and dynamic systems, rather than classical physics models of 
simple, static systems. (Connell 1995). 
Dewey’s  specification of the power of the ‘experimental  inquiry method’ to support 
robust reflection of the kind required for M2 focuses on ‘three outstanding characteristics’. 
(Dewey 1960 p 106) The first that experimentation involves  overt doing, the making of 
definite changes in the environment or in our relation to it, in response to some impetus 
such a  question, or of something which arouses curiosity. Second, ‘experiment is not a 
random activity’.   It is consciously directed according to the parameters of the inquiry. 
This is useful in trying to achieve M2, avoiding some of the pitfalls of bad reflection. Third,  
the  outcome  is  ‘the  construction  of  a  new  empirical  situation  in  which  objects  are 
differently related to one another…and the consequences of directed operations form the 
objects that have the property of being known’ (ibid. pp. 86-87). 
‘The  sum and substance of  the present  argument  is  that  if  we  frame our 
conception of knowledge on the experimental model, we find that it is a way of 
operating upon and with the things of ordinary experience so that we can frame 
our ideas of them in terms of their  interactions with one another’ (Dewey l960, 
p.107).
Importantly  we  need  to  conceive  of  this  ‘framing  of  a  conception’  as  in  a  flow  of  
experienced cognition, not as a separate state that ‘pulls us up short’. We need to think in  
terms of Schön’s reflection-in-action (REF). 
In  examining  the  growth  of  practical  knowledge  (KH)  through  experience  Dewey 
describes the occurrence of a disabling problematic situation, which ends in an enabling 
understanding of what to do next, in new ‘know how’. 
''.According to the pattern set by the practice of knowing, knowledge is the fruit of 
the  undertakings  that  transform  a  problematic  situation  into  a  resolved  one.'  
(Dewey, 1960, pp 242-3).    
In  the  first  phase  of  inquiry,  someone  experiences  herself  to  be  in  a  problematic 
situation, with a sense of being ‘pulled up short’ or ‘hitting the buffers’, aware that she is 
not able to operate as she normally does: the flow of her actions is interrupted, requiring 
‘something to be done’.  In the second phase she recognises what  has troubled the 
instinctual behaviour and caused her to be ‘pulled up short’.  Dewey’s formula is that 
‘cognitive elements enter into the process as a response to precognitive ‘maladjustment’. 
(Dewey, lw.1.44)  In this phase she takes cognisance of what the problem is. There are 
many possible ways in which she could ‘read’ the situation. She will  only be able to 
isolate a few of these possible interpretations, such is the nature of cognition within the 
fleeting and constantly changing moments of phenomena.  (Sartre,  1938; Heidegger, 
1962).  Her ‘reading’ or ‘interpretation’ of the experience of being ‘pulled up short’, is the  
basis on which she subsequently operates.  How she determines ‘what her problem is’ 
becomes a basis for the last phase, in which she is able to extract ideas, suppositions,  
theories,  and  muse  on  these  as  hypothetical  solutions  to  the  ‘blockage’.  These 
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reflections can happen whilst still  actively engaged in the situation, in which case the 
adjustments are akin to bio-feedback and bear some resemblance to what Schőn has 
called reflection-in-action.  They can also be at one remove, such as when analysing a 
problematic situation while not actually in it. This is more akin to Schõn’s reflection-on-
action.  Schőn  uses  his  term  reflection-in-action  consistently  to  refer  to  fluent 
professionally demonstrated expertise that appears non-cognitive and instinctive when 
being exercised in practice. 
The power of using empirical experimentalist methods to resolve questions 
arising from practical situations is not limited to the new understandings which 
are developed. Not only new understandings may arise, but also through the 
process of inquiry new methods, concepts and tools may be developed, which in 
turn may give rise to new understandings which could not exist previously, such 
as when new tools are developed in a particular industry, because they are needed 
to perform some practical task for which existing tools were inadequate: 
‘Something needed to be done to accomplish an end; various devices and 
methods of operation were tried. Experiences of success and failure 
gradually improved the means used. More economical and effective ways 
of acting were found - that is, operations which gave the desired kind of 
result with greater ease, less irrelevancy and less ambiguity, greater 
security. Each forward step was attended with making better tools. Often 
the invention of a tool suggested operations not in mind when it was in-
vented and thus carried the perfecting of operations still further. (ibid., p. 
124). 
I think this account of tool development is essentially plausible and accurate. How 
does this account relate to the practice of teaching? Specifically it implies that the 
meanings which are created in teaching only emerge in the practice.  The teacher 
may enable the learner to develop a sense of the significance of a concept, or to 
grasp a skill, but the precise way in which this outcome will be achieved cannot 
be regulated in advance of the situation in which it is created, although some facts 
about how to achieve a similar, desired outcome may be known.  Take for 
example a typical French lesson in which the teacher is trying to get her pupils to 
know, understand and be able to use correctly, in context and from memory, 
structures related to the weather.  She may decide in advance on  a variety of 
techniques to achieve her objective, such as the use of symbols and pictures, 
getting the pupils to repeat certain phrases, providing them with a grid in which to 
tick what they hear, so that they do not need to see a written source.  She may also 
decide in what order to phase various activities. There is a body of empirical and 
theoretical work on this mode of communicative language teaching, and a body of 
knowledge about the communicative methodology in teaching a foreign language, 
on which she can draw. When the teacher teaches the lesson she has planned, with 
a particular group of pupils, on a particular occasion, it will ‘come out’ in  a 
particular way and be received in a particular way.  If the teacher is then able to 
reflect on what had happened and has successful ways to take feedback on the 
pupils’ perceptions,  and evidence of how well they had learnt what she intended, 
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she is likely to do something differently next time she teaches the same lesson, 
provided she believes that something different is required to achieve the outcome, 
knows what this is and understands how to go about it. A specific example in the 
case of the weather lesson follows. The pupils all produced the French phrase for 
‘foggy day’ when the stimulus in the situation required ‘a rainy day’. The teacher 
reflects back on the lesson and believes that her visual prompt for the foggy day 
was ambiguous.  She downloads a better picture from the internet.  The next class 
are still confused.  She wonders if the children may not have much experience of 
fog and decides to teach the concept of fog with gestures and also check on the 
children’s experiences. She does just this, and discovers that most of the pupils 
have not experienced fog but that there is a wealth of weather experience among 
some of the children in her class recently arrived in England, which is of interest 
to the pupils. Several outcomes ensue which the teacher did not expect, of a 
cognitive, social and affective nature.  A usually quiet pupil becomes voluble and 
articulate about being caught in the street in monsoon rain.  Her story enthralls the 
class and she in turn benefits from the attention accorded her.  A couple of 
demotivated children remember their journey to their grandparents home in a 
blizzard and this draws them into the lesson on weather and engages them with 
the content.   Someone mentions the television pictures of the recent Thailand 
tsunami and the discussion widens in an immediately accessible manner to the 
force of nature. Spiritual values are expressed about respect for the earth. Ethical 
questions are raised about aid and compassion to the victims is expressed. So the 
relevance of Dewey’s tool making  analogy to my current purposes is the 
conclusion that Dewey draws from his example that there can be no a priori test 
or rule for the determination of the operations which define ideas. I believe that in 
practical affairs procedures are always provisional:  the way that things need to be 
done, or should be done can only be determined by doing, reflecting and redoing. 
I concur with Dewey that ‘the operations which govern ideas originate in what 
men naturally do and are tested and improved in the course of doing’ (ibid.), and 
also that in the doing new modes of doing may emerge. Dewey describes this 
process as the development of ‘the operations of the art of scientific 
experimentation’ (ibid.). It may seem paradoxical to put ‘art’ and ‘science’ 
together in the way he does, but it seems to me that the phrase is a good 
description of teaching and that both of those concepts are made coherent with 
each other through the notion of experimentation.
Teacher trainers attempt to develop teachers who not only have specific skills  
but  also are in  some sense exemplary figures.  Standards based assessment 
(M1)  cannot  encompass  all  dimensions  of  teaching,  such  as  the  normative. 
Dewey’s formulation can be helpful in our quest for an M1/M2 reconciliation. For 
example,  when Dewey explains how he conceptualises operational definitions 
and relations we have a tool for connecting the individual experiencing subject 
with the wider explanatory descriptors in the public domain.To know how to act in 
a situation of complexity is to have a repository of strategies which have been 
established  through experience  and  which  are  recognised  as  relevant  to  the 
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present  moment  of  the  subject.  In  a  situation  of  changing  events  what  is 
important for a participant subject is 
‘the correlation among these changes or events. When these correlations are 
discovered, the possibility of control is in our hands
An individual builds these correlations through her own affective and cognitive 
responses, in interaction with the situation. 
I am not suggesting that a participant subject goes through some laborious staged 
process of finding out what these inter-relations are.  This would be to misrepresent what 
I believe Dewey means. An analogy would be the famous statement by Mozart that he 
‘heard’ an oeuvre, like a symphony, in his mind’s ear, and that an entire work would 
‘flash’ through him in this way, within the space of a few minutes. He took cognisance of  
this symphony in this way, and then spent many hours and days writing out in musical 
notation what he had experienced.  Similarly, an expert professional like a teacher in the 
classroom can work within a complexity of events and a trainee may learn to become an 
expert,  given certain conditions.  I  am claiming that  a teacher in a classroom can be 
helped to understand what elements play a role in building the totality of the classroom 
situation and how they relate and inter-relate.  Some theoretical  knowledge of  various 
topics, such as planning or child development, can help to structure her learning.  What 
will  make it real for her, and become part of her repertoire for performance, will  come 
about  when  she  is  able  to  act  on  the  knowledge  gained  in  theory,  in  her  practical 
situation.   
So if we re-visit the idea of "experimental empiricism" it seems to enable us to keep 
what is sound and acceptable in M1, the ‘thin’ standards based training  version, the 
emphasis  on  being  able  to  articulate  and  illustrate  ‘what  works’  and  to  build  up  an 
evidence  base,  whilst  not  falsifying  the  nature  of  experiential  learning..  Dewey’s 
exposition has  led  to  a  view of  the acquisition  of  practical  knowledge (KH)  which  is 
transactional  and existential;  it  includes an agent doing and acting in a situation;  the 
subject  and  object  of  experience  are  encompassed  within  the  same  ‘frame’.  The 
implications  for  this  account  are  that  teacher  training  needs  to  broaden  out  beyond 
standards based assessment in order both to promote and assess the kind of rich and 
connected understanding which teachers need. A model  of  teacher training needs to 
include  opportunities  for  effective,  non  ritualistic,  reflection.  Standards  are  useful 
descriptors of practice, provided they are suitably formulated to describe what they can 
usefully  encompass  in  terms  of  specific  skills  and  performance.  Extra  elements  are 
needed to encompass support and enable effective reflection. I here highlight three. First, 
the importance of mentoring, around specific agendas, not narrowly tied to standards or 
competenices, (REFS) Secondly, the introduction of mechanisms for promoting effective 
reflection, such as the use of teacher narrative (refs).  Third, the promotion of the idea of  
scholarly teaching, involving teacher as researcher (refs), Fourth the systematic use of 
professional development portfolios. (refs). 
Conclusion:
11
 Constructing Teacher Knowledge: Conflicting Views and  Synthesising Possibilities
In the field of practitioner and work place learning we can find examples of 
good practice  in  the  areas  of  mentoring,  the  use  of  narrative  for  professional 
development, practitioner research  and the use of portfolios for the development 
and assessment of practical knowledge and understanding. These elements need to 
be incorporated into initial teacher training programmes and into assessment for 
qualified  teacher  status,  in  order  to  account  for  the  way  in  which  teacher 
knowledge  and  understanding  develops.  A  defensible  programme  of  teacher 
training  and  education  values  the  teacher  trainers’  professional  judgement  in 
fostering and assessing elements of reflective practice. Assessment which is not 
narrowly  focused  on  standards  allows  a  substantial  place  for  professional 
judgement to grow and operate, and thereby supports the development of practical 
knowledge (KH) A programme which incorporates such elements enables space 
for a new teacher’s own direction, and hence involves the development of her 
own professional judgement more deeply than a standards led curriculum
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